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The functioning of democratic regimes and effective gov-
ernance depend on the proper functioning of accountabil-
ity mechanisms, which in turn depend on political institu-
tions and actors being evaluated based on the outcomes 
they deliver. In societies characterised by a high degree of 
polarisation and sharply divided political identities, trust in 
political institutions and evaluation of democracy are likely 
to depend on partisanship more than on any other factor. 
The article aims to explain the determinants of trust in po-
litical institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Cro-
atia as a highly polarised society, focusing on the role parti-
sanship and representation have in trust in institutions and 
in satisfaction with democracy. The article establishes that 
partisanship is an important factor in shaping trust in insti-
tutions and evaluations of democracy. This effect is equally 
present with respect to trust in political institutions, such 
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as government and parliament, and non-political institu-
tions, such as public administration and the judiciary. 
Keywords: trust in institutions, democracy satisfaction, po-
litical support, polarisation
1. Introduction
The sustainability of all democratic political regimes requires at least tacit 
consent and passive support for the democratic political institutions of 
the citizens. More importantly, democratic political regimes require cit-
izen acceptance of basic democratic principles and of the consequences 
these principles produce in the life of a polity. Acceptance of democratic 
norms, such as free and fair elections and the use of the majority rule in 
decision-making, presupposes acceptance of their outcomes, such as the 
formation of a government composed of parties one did not vote for, or 
acceptance of the public expression of values and views one profoundly 
disagrees with. The effective functioning of the democratic political sys-
tem also requires citizens to trust political institutions and to evaluate 
governments based on their performance. 
However, in highly polarised societies, with deep ideological divisions and 
strong political identities, where politics is often seen as a zero-sum game, 
it is likely that trust in institutions and support for the democratic political 
system is shaped more by citizens’ positions on issues defining the lines of 
polarisation than on the outcomes which democratic institutions deliver. 
Consequently, it is also likely that in highly polarised societies mechanisms 
of democratic accountability are not fully effective. If so, the way citizens as-
sess the functioning of national political institutions and democracy will be 
shaped principally by whether their preferred party is in power and whether 
the government agenda represents their views (Anderson et al., 2005).
If the role played by partisan identification and political identities in shap-
ing democracy evaluations and trust in institutions hampers the effective 
functioning of accountability mechanisms, and if the zero-sum game view 
of politics prevails, it is likely that the efficiency of governance mechanisms 
will also be affected to some degree. Political systems in which political 
actors are not held accountable for their performance, and are evaluated 
predominantly by how well they represent their supporters’ ideologies and 
political identities, may result in suboptimal governance outcomes. Political 
actors who are not held accountable for the outcomes they deliver are less 
likely to care about corruption, as their voters are less likely to punish them 
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at the ballot box if they do engage in corruption (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 
2007). They are also more likely to engage in crony practices and are more 
inclined to direct public resources towards their constituents (Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson, 2007). In extreme cases, when polarisation is very strong, polit-
ical actors could also subvert independent institutions in order to achieve 
partisan control of policy or to strengthen their grip on power. 
Since the country’s first democratic elections, the Croatian political system 
has been characterised by highly salient ideological divisions based on op-
posing interpretations of history and questions about the role of tradition, 
religion, and modernity in contemporary Croatian society. These divisions, 
in turn, have shaped political identities and determined the political atti-
tudes and behaviour of most Croatian citizens (s. Šiber, 2001; Zakošek, 
1998; Zakošek & Čular, 2004; Henjak et al., 2013; Grdešić, 2013). Given 
the salience and the power of ideological and identity divisions in Croatian 
politics, it is highly likely that political identities are shaping citizens’ evalua-
tions of Croatian democracy and its institutions. Because political identities 
are represented by parties, and because political parties alternate in power, 
the impact of political identities on political support is likely to be shaped 
by the support for the winning or losing parties representing these identi-
ties. This study seeks to find an answer to this question by analysing the de-
terminants of democracy satisfaction and of trust in democratic institutions 
in Croatia. In doing so, it aims to test the proposition that in the Croatian 
context partisanship and political identity are the dominant factors shaping 
evaluations of democracy and trust in political institutions. 
Thus far, there have been few studies investigating sources of political 
support in Croatia, and Croatia has often been omitted from comparative 
studies of political support. In addition, despite the established impor-
tance of symbolic and historical divisions in Croatian politics and their 
link to ideological identification and partisanship, there have been no 
studies aimed at investigating the impact of partisanship on other dimen-
sions of politics and political support, particularly in the Croatian context. 
This study aims to fill this gap and to test the impact of partisanship on 
satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions in Croatia. 
2. Conceptualising Political Support
An analysis of sources of political support necessarily starts with a defini-
tion of an object of support (s. Dalton, 1999; Norris, 1999). The principal 
distinction is between objects of political support, distinguishing between 
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diffuse and specific support (Easton, 1965; 1975). It distinguishes be-
tween support for the principles, values, and norms of a political regime 
on the one hand, and support for specific policies, outcomes, or political 
actors on the other (Easton, 1975). This Easton’s dichotomy presupposes 
that support for the founding principles of a political regime need not be 
affected when citizens are dissatisfied with current policies, government 
actors, or their results. In democratic systems, this distinction is essential, 
because it ensures that support for a political regime is not undermined 
by bad performance of governments, parties, or their policies. Within this 
framework, Easton distinguishes between three principal objects of sup-
port: a political community, a political regime, and the government in 
office (s. Dalton, 1999; Norris, 1999). Easton goes on to makes a distinc-
tion between affective and evaluative support, where the former is based 
on agreements with principles and the latter is based on evaluations of ef-
fectiveness. The principal difference in this conceptualisation distinguish-
es between support for political regimes and that for political actors. This 
distinction is relevant because in a democracy, if dissatisfaction cannot be 
directed at political actors and addressed through elections, it is likely to 
lead to a decrease in support for a political regime and, perhaps, even to 
a decrease in support for democracy as a principle.1
Regime performance in delivering social and economic outcomes is a quan-
tifiable measure whereby the perceptions of individual citizens may differ 
to a certain degree, depending on their interests and political preferences. 
However, politics is not only about instrumental outcomes and calculable 
benefits. Politics, particularly in democratic regimes, is also about expres-
sive outcomes, such as the representation of values and political identities, 
and even about partisanship or identification with individual candidates 
1 The question is how well citizens can distinguish between objects of support, and 
whether they can understand the crucial difference between a political regime and its princi-
ples on the one hand, and political actors and their performance on the other. There is ample 
empirical evidence that citizens are indeed capable of making a distinction between support 
for political regimes and support for political actors in government (Klingemann, 1999; Dal-
ton, 1999). However, more recent studies (Magalhães, 2014; Linde, 2012) find that diffuse 
and specific support are linked. In fact, Magalhães (2014) and Linde (2012) argue that if 
a political regime is characterised by low quality of governance, this is not only likely to 
reduce specific support for political actors and their policies, but also to lead to a decline in 
diffuse support for the regime principles (Magalhães, 2014). Several recent empirical studies 
have found support for this argument, as weak economic performance of national economic 
systems and high levels of inequality have been found to result in lower levels of support 
for democracy as a political regime (Andersen, 2012; Krieckhaus et al., 2013), and lower 
satisfaction with democracy performance (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014). 
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(Brennan & Lomasky, 1993; Brennan & Hamlin, 2000). Therefore, in the 
expressive dimension of politics, voters do not derive utility from instru-
mentally beneficial outcomes, such as economic growth or income. Instead, 
utility is derived from expressively favourable outcomes, whereby the cit-
izens’ views, values, or identities are represented in the political system, 
and the act of voting is mainly about expressing support for the parties 
and candidates representing one’s values, identities, and views (Brennan & 
Lomasky, 1993). Thus, given the importance of the expressive dimension 
of politics, representation and partisanship are likely to play an important 
role as determinants of satisfaction with democracy and trust in political 
institutions. In societies like Croatia, with its high polarisation and political 
divisions based on evaluations of history, symbols, values, and identities, 
expressive factors are likely to be particularly important. 
From the perspective of the expressive dimension of politics, it is immedi-
ately obvious that, at the level of support for the government, individual cit-
izens are less likely to support a government if it is composed of parties they 
did not vote for. Conversely, citizens who did support the governing parties 
in the elections are more likely to be satisfied and trust the government be-
cause it reflects their political identity and values (s. Anderson et al., 2005). 
Government composition also affects evaluations of regime performance 
and regime institutions. A number of empirical studies have established 
that support for governing parties is likely to increase satisfaction with de-
mocracy and trust in political institutions, whereas support for opposition 
parties is likely to have exactly the opposite effects (Anderson et al., 2005; 
Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Singh et al., 2012; Dahlberg & Holmberg, 
2012; Dalton, 2005). Furthermore, empirical studies have established 
that as the distance between individual and government ideological po-
sitions increases, satisfaction with democracy declines (Anderson et al., 
2005; Dahlberg et al., 2013; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). Finally, the less 
close citizens feel to a governing party (Anderson et al., 2005; Dalton, 
2005; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002), or if they feel the government is not 
responsive to their views (Anderson et al., 2005; Cattenberg & Moreno, 
2005), the less likely they are to trust political institutions.
That evaluations of democracy and political institutions are found to be 
conditional on a subjective feeling of representation and the electoral for-
tunes of preferred parties suggests that politics is often perceived as a 
zero-sum game. In zero-sum game politics, citizens are more likely to 
evaluate a political regime and political institutions positively if their side 
is winning. Furthermore, the overall effect of partisanship and representa-
tion on satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions is likely to be 
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dependent on the level of polarisation in a society (Tóka, 2003; Anderson 
et al., 2005). If ideological polarisation is low, political identities are not 
exclusive, and cleavages generally cross-cut each other, the question of 
who is electoral winner is less consequential than in the cases where ideo-
logical polarisation is high, political identities are exclusive, and cleavages 
reinforce each other (Tóka, 2003). Consequently, in highly polarised soci-
eties, where political identities are based on a fundamental disagreement 
over interpretations of the history of a political community and its found-
ing values, politics is much more likely to be seen as a zero-sum game. It 
is, therefore, more likely for citizens in these societies to be less satisfied 
with democracy and trust political institutions less if these produce gov-
ernments they do not like (Anderson et al., 2005). 
In highly polarised societies, where divisions based on ideology, identity, or 
partisanship are very strong, the loss of an election implies that the citizens 
voting for an electoral loser will not be represented on the government’s 
agenda. If this happens, it is likely that the citizens supporting the losing 
side will be critical not only of the government, but also of the institutions 
and the democratic regime which have brought about such an outcome (s. 
Anderson et al., 2005). Similarly, strong polarisation based on ideology or 
identity is likely to have an impact on the effectiveness of accountability 
mechanisms (Körösény, 2013). If evaluations of democracy and political 
institutions are dependent on partisanship, ideology, or political identity, 
and politics is seen as a zero-sum game, the political system and its institu-
tions are unlikely to be evaluated based on their performance in delivering 
social and economic outcomes. Rather, political institutions will most likely 
be evaluated on how well they represent the ideological, partisan, and iden-
tity preferences of their citizens. The consequence of this development is 
that citizens place greater emphasis on whether their preferred party is in 
power and less on whether this party is delivering good social and economic 
outcomes. Consequently, because political actors are evaluated more on 
the basis of who they are and where they stand ideologically than on how 
well they govern, the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms working 
through representation and elections will inevitably be diluted.
3. Support for Democracy and Trust in Political 
Institutions in Croatia
Since the first democratic elections in 1990, ideological divisions based on 
interpretations of history and views of the role of religion, tradition, and 
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modernity have been shaping politics in Croatia (Šiber, 2001; Zakošek, 
1998; Zakošek & Čular, 2004; Henjak et al., 2013). These ideological 
divisions emerged through the mobilisation of political identities devel-
oping since the introduction of mass politics into Croatia, shaped by 
historical events such as the formation of Yugoslavia, the Second World 
War, and the Croatian Spring. Historical events shaped social develop-
ment, often through violence and conflict, and produced deep divisions 
between the opposing sides in these conflicts. The Second World War was 
undoubtedly the most traumatic political event in modern Croatian histo-
ry. In Croatia, this was a civil war between communists and Ustashe, an 
ethnic conflict between Croats and Serbs, a fight against occupation, and 
a social revolution in one. The war largely destroyed pre-war society, its 
political organisations and identities, and replaced them with new politi-
cal identities forged in conflict and very hostile to each other. The nature 
of the conflict engulfed the whole of society and essentially removed the 
option of non-participation in the conflict. In the end, the communists 
won, and in an effort to consolidate their power dealt with the losing 
side through brutal repression, which enabled supporters of the Ustashe 
regime to claim the mantle of victims despite being responsible for ma-
jor war crimes. After the war, the communist regime dealt with the past 
by imposing an interpretation of history designed to build its legitimacy, 
and suppressed all alternative narratives and political identities. However, 
the narrative of the losing side in the war and other groups repressed by 
the communist regime persisted in the private sphere and enabled the 
creation of a separate political identity in opposition to the regime, and 
supported by the Catholic church (Šiber, 2001). 
Political identities shaped through historical events became fully mobi-
lised when democratic politics was introduced into Croatia in 1990. This 
process exposed the deep divisions over interpretations of history, the 
definition of national identity, and the definition of values on which the 
independent Croatian state and society should be founded. New political 
parties emerged aligned along these symbolic and identity issues, while 
issues related to economic interests had very little, if any, relevance (Šib-
er, 2001; Zakošek, 1998). While these divisions were somewhat subdued 
during the War of Independence in the 1990s, they never lost relevance 
and have possibly even increased in importance since the 2000 elections. 
Partisan competition in the 1990s was characterised by an asymmetric 
pattern of competition – produced by an electoral system which produced 
majority governments by HDZ as the dominant party – a strong presiden-
tial system, and an opposition divided into several parties arrayed along a 
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dominant cleavage dimension but united in a desire to bring about an end 
to HDZ dominance. After 2000, with the introduction of a proportional 
electoral system and a parliamentary system of government, political com-
petition consolidated into two clearly separate and ideologically homog-
enous blocks, alternating in power in a wholesale manner, while parties 
attempting to play a role of a pivot between the two blocks rapidly lost 
electoral support and political relevance.2
While political blocks in Croatia represent two poles of a cleavage, it must 
be noted that these cleavages are fuelled by issues related to history, sym-
bols, and values (Zakošek & Čular, 2004). Thus the cleavages dominating 
Croatian society are not based on interest divisions that can be accommo-
dated easily. Instead, the cleavages are based on symbols, identities, and 
interpretations of history where consensus has been elusive and divisions 
persistent since the creation of democratic politics. These issues have also 
shaped the ideological identification of Croatian citizens, with interpreta-
tions of history and attitudes towards religion and tradition emerging as 
the most important determinants of the citizens’ ideological orientations 
(Jou, 2010). 
In this context, political divisions based on social and economic outcomes 
are largely irrelevant as determinants of electoral behaviour, partisan iden-
tification, and political identities (Zakošek & Čular, 2004; Henjak et al., 
2013). Empirical studies thus far have been unable to find the effects of 
economic issues on political behaviour and partisanship to any significant 
degree. In fact, the effect is found to be reversed, in that economic posi-
tions are influenced by partisanship, with voters supporting the economic 
policies promoted by their favourite parties and not the other way around 
(Henjak, 2007). Electoral results in such a context have depended predom-
inantly on the ability of parties in both blocks to mobilise their supporters, 
and much less on the ability of parties to draw supporters from the other 
block. Furthermore, parties tend to lose elections primarily when their vot-
ers are discouraged to participate in elections because of their dissatisfac-
tion with how parties have performed in government (Henjak, 2011).
Strong polarisation on ideological issues, combined with the bipolar di-
vision of parties and voters into two clearly separate and ideologically 
strongly divided political blocks, combined with a low political salience of 
2 This development affected HSLS and HSS, two of the strongest opposition parties 
in the 1992 and 1995 elections, which then switched sides in the 2003 and 2007 elections 
and entered into a coalition with HDZ. 
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economic issues, is also likely to affect patterns of political support in Cro-
atia. Given the strong ideological polarisation over identity, values, and 
symbols in Croatian society, it is to be expected that evaluations of de-
mocracy and trust in political institutions are strongly influenced by parti-
sanship and representation, because these variables transfer the impact of 
political identities to government support. More specifically, it is to be ex-
pected that supporters of governing parties are more likely to be satisfied 
with democracy and to have greater trust in political institutions, because 
democracy has produced the outcomes they desire, and governments are 
likely to represent their ideological or partisan preferences. Consequently, 
partisanship, or to be more precise, support for government or opposition 
parties, and ideological congruence between voters and government is 
likely to play a large role in shaping democracy evaluations and trust in 
political institutions. 
The conceptualisation of political trust is a somewhat contested issue. The 
question arises whether political trust can be conceptualised as a single 
concept or whether there are multiple dimensions of political trust based 
on the different relations between citizens and political actors (s. Hooghe 
2011; Fisher et al., 2010). However, the relevant question in the context 
of strong political polarisation and strong identities is how trust in dem-
ocratic institutions, which are not supposed to be political, is related to 
trust in government, which is political. It is conceivable that in societies 
with strong ideological polarisation, such as Croatia, the effect of parti-
sanship on trust is not limited to government institutions, which are in ef-
fect political, such as the national government or the national parliament, 
but extends to institutions which are supposed to be non-political, such 
as the judiciary or public administration. It would be reasonable to expect 
that the impact of partisanship and political identities on trust in the ju-
diciary and public administration is weaker than its impact on trust in the 
government and parliaments. In either case, analysing the two separate-
ly provides us with insight into the impact partisanship and representa-
tion have on trust in institutions, parliament, and government on the one 
hand, and the justice system and public administration on the other. 
4. Determinants of Political Support
Given the presence of deep political divisions based on ideology and 
identity in Croatia, it is to be expected that citizens supporting incum-
bent parties at the time of elections are more likely to be satisfied with 
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democracy and more trusting of political institutions than citizens who 
supported losing parties or citizens who did not participate in elections. 
Furthermore, it is to be expected that citizens who are ideologically closer 
to governing parties will also be more satisfied with the functioning of 
democracy and will have more trust in institutions than those who are 
ideologically more distant from the government position. 
Apart from partisanship and representation, a number of other factors are 
likely to affect satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institu-
tions. These include personal socioeconomic position, evaluations of the 
economic situation, trust in other members of society, political efficacy, 
education, political knowledge, and political authoritarianism. These fac-
tors will be considered in the analysis in order to assess the relative power 
of partisanship in comparison with the other variables. 
Studies of political support find that socioeconomic position is an impor-
tant determinant of satisfaction with democracy. Economically better-off 
citizens are found to be more satisfied with democracy and to have a higher 
level of trust in institutions (s. Andersen, 2012; Krieckhaus et al., 2013). 
Similar findings have been recorded with respect to evaluations of eco-
nomic performance, both personal and societal. Several studies have estab-
lished that citizens who evaluate their personal and the national economy 
more positively tend to be more satisfied with democracy and have a high-
er level of trust in institutions (Krieckhaus et al., 2013; Magalhães, 2014; 
Armingeon & Gutthmann, 2014; Cattenberg & Moreno, 2005). 
Political efficacy, or the citizens’ perception of the effectiveness of their 
participation in politics, is also found to affect satisfaction with democra-
cy and trust in institutions. Citizens with higher levels of political efficacy 
perceptions are found to have more positive evaluations of political insti-
tutions and regime performance (Cattenberg & Moreno, 2005; Krieck-
haus et al., 2013). Similarly, trust in other members of society translates 
into political support and is associated with a higher level of satisfaction 
with democracy, as well as with a higher level of trust in political institu-
tions (Krieckhaus et al., 2013; Magalhães, 2014; Armingeon & Gutth-
mann, 2014; Cattenberg & Moreno, 2005; Dowely & Silver, 2002). 
Education is associated with positive evaluations of regime performance 
and a higher level of confidence in political institutions (Krieckhaus et 
al., 2013; Magalhães, 2014; Armingeon & Gutthmann, 2014). However, 
the opposite is the case with the impact of political knowledge, which is 
found to be negatively correlated with democracy satisfaction and trust in 
political institutions (Dahlberg et al., 2013). 
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Finally, political authoritarianism is likely to affect satisfaction with de-
mocracy and trust in political institutions, because citizens who are more 
deferential to authority are also likely to be less critical of the way political 
regime and its institutions perform. Thus, it is to be expected that polit-
ically more authoritarian citizens will be more satisfied with democracy 
and more trusting of political institutions (Devos et al., 2002). 
5. Data and Analysis
The paper proceeds to test these propositions using survey data collect-
ed immediately after the 2011, 2015, and 2016 parliamentary elections. 
To test the impact of partisanship, the dataset needs to include the time 
points when parties from both political blocks were in government, or to 
be more precise, it needs to include the time points when HDZ and its 
allies held office, as well as when SDP and its partners did so. In the data 
used in this paper HDZ and its allies controlled the government before 
the 2011 and 2016 elections, while SDP and its partners controlled the 
government before the 2015 elections. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to extend the timeframe of the analysis to the elections held in 2007 and 
earlier because the Faculty of Political Science surveys conducted before 
2011 did not include all the items needed to consistently measure, over 
multiple time points, all the independent concepts used in the analysis. 
Each survey includes about 1,000 respondents, which gives a total of 
3,001 respondents. The first dependent variable, satisfaction with democ-
racy, is measured by an item asking the respondent how satisfied he or she 
is with how democracy works in Croatia. The second dependent variable 
measures trust in government, and is composed of two items asking the 
respondents how much they trust the government and the parliament. 
This variable measures trust in political institutions dominated by political 
parties. A separate variable including items measuring trust in public ad-
ministration and the judiciary measures trust in institutions which are not 
directly associated with partisan politics. Four individual items composing 
these two variables are highly correlated with each other and load on the 
same factor in the factor analysis, with the exception of the 2011 survey, 
when trust in the judiciary and public administration load on a separate 
factor. For this reason, and to differentiate conceptually between insti-
tutions dominated by parties and institutions which are supposed to be 
independent of partisan politics, two separate variables measuring trust in 
institutions are used here.
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The independent variables include measures of support for the incumbent 
party, subjective representation (or ideological congruence with the pre-
ferred political party), political authoritarianism, political efficacy, eval-
uations of the economic situation, level of political knowledge, wealth, 
education, age, and trust in others.
Support for the incumbent party is measured by a dichotomous variable 
indicating a vote for the party or coalition which was in power before the 
elections. Subjective representation is a variable measuring the difference 
between individual self-placement on a left–right scale and the govern-
ment position on a left–right scale, calculated as the combined left–right 
position of all governing parties weighted by their seat share in parliament 
in order to measure their relative influence on government position. Data 
on the left–right position of political parties is taken from the Chapel Hill 
expert survey conducted in 2010 (Bakker et al., 2015).
Political authoritarianism is measured by three items asking the respond-
ents if (1) they agree that the task of the opposition is to support the 
government as opposed to criticising it, (2) they agree that citizens do not 
have the right to strike and demonstrate if this endangers public order, 
and (3) it is justifiable to limit civil liberties if interests of the state and 
nation are at stake. The variable is computed by taking the mean value of 
these three items. Higher values indicate a higher level of political author-
itarianism.
Political efficacy is measured by two items asking the respondents if they 
agree with the statement that who people vote for influences events in the 
country, and if they agree that who is in government matters. This variable 
is calculated by taking the mean value of these two items. Higher values 
indicate a greater sense of individual political efficacy. 
Economic evaluations are measured as an average of two items asking 
the respondent if his or her personal economic situation has improved 
over the last four years and if the economic situation in the country has 
improved over the last four years. This variable is calculated by taking 
the mean value of these two items. Higher values indicate more positive 
economic evaluations. 
Trust in others is measured by a single item asking the respondent if other 
people can be trusted or not. Political knowledge is measured by four vari-
ables asking respondents factual questions about politics. These questions 
attempt to find out if the respondents know, for instance, who the finance 
minister of Croatia was before the elections, who the current president of 
the European Commission is, which institution oversees monetary policy 
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in Croatia, and what the highest judicial body in Croatia is. The variable 
is calculated by adding up the correct answers. Wealth is measured by a 
variable composed of four items asking the respondent if he or she owns 
a house or a flat, commercial or private property which can be rented, 
stocks, bonds, or savings. The variable is calculated by adding up all the 
items of wealth respondent owns. The remaining two variables are age 
and education. Age measures how old the respondent is, while education 
measures the highest level of education the respondent has attained. 
6. Results
Because all the dependent variables are continuous, the analysis uses OLS 
regression with a pooled dataset composed of three electoral surveys. Giv-
en that the pooled dataset includes three surveys from three separate elec-
tions, the OLS model is estimated using cluster corrected standard error 
to control for the potential clustering of standard errors within years. Also, 
to control for potential election-specific effects and year effects, two dum-
my variables indicating the 2015 and 2016 elections were added, with the 
2011 elections being a reference category. 
Table 1 presents the results of the regression analysis with three dependent 
variables. Something that clearly emerges from the analysis is the strength 
of the impact of support for the governing party on democracy satisfac-
tion and trust in institutions. For all three dependent variables, the impact 
of support for the governing party is significant and positive. Because all 
the dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale, the impact of 
partisanship can be compared directly across all three dependent varia-
bles. It is evident that the impact of support for the governing party is the 
strongest in the case of democracy satisfaction. The effect of partisanship 
on trust in government and parliament is about one quarter weaker in 
strength, and the effect on trust in the judiciary and public administration 
is weaker still. The impact of the subjective feeling of representation is 
significant only as a determinant of trust in government, but it does not 
register a significant effect in the case of other dependent variables. This 
is not unusual given that the government and parliament are institutions 
tasked with representing the citizens’ positions. This might also provide 
the answer why the impact of representation on the other two variables is 
not significant. 
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Table 1. OLS regression results for the three dependent variables measuring sat-
isfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions









Constant 1,369*** 0,984*** 1,238***
(0,162) (0,123) (0,118)
Political authoritarianism 0,141*** 0,169*** 0,185***
(0,024) (0,018) (0,018)
Political efficacy 0,011 0,106*** 0,078***
(0,020) (0,015) (0,015)
Trust in others 0,228*** 0,312*** 0,149***
(0,057) (0,043) (0,042)
Support for governing party 0,256*** 0,180*** 0,119**
(0,058) (0,044) (0,042)
Subjective representation 0,003 0,026** 0,018
(0,013) (0,010) (0,010)
Economic evaluations 0,376*** 0,270*** 0,209***
(0,033) (0,025) (0,024)
Political knowledge 0,015 –0,012 –0,021
(0,024) (0,019) (0,018)
Wealth 0,016  0,002 0,036
(0,030) (0,023) (0,022)
Education –0,043*  0,012 –0,043**
(0,020) (0,015) (0,015)
Age 0,002  0,006*** 0,000
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
2015 –0,182** –0,656*** –0,049
(0,070) (0,053) (0,051)
2016 –0,446*** –0,850*** –0,086
(0,069) (0,053) (0,051)
Adjusted R square 0,087 0,200 0,090
N=3001, ***p<0,001, **p<0,01, *p<0,05; Source: Author’s calculations
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Turning to other variables, political authoritarianism has a significant ef-
fect on all three dependent variables. This is not surprising, because the 
more authoritarian a person is, the more likely they are to trust institutions 
which represent the authority of the state. The fact that more authoritar-
ian people are also more satisfied with democracy may be explained by 
their somewhat lower standards for evaluating democracy and the lower 
expectations they have from democracy. Interestingly, the effect is strong-
est for trust in the judiciary and public administration (perhaps because 
these institutions are supposed to enforce state authority), somewhat low-
er for trust in government and parliament, which are more political and 
contentious, and lower still for satisfaction with democracy. 
With respect to trust in others, the more trusting a respondent is, the 
more likely he or she is to trust institutions and be satisfied with democra-
cy. This effect may represent the transfer of a general disposition to trust 
other members of society onto political institutions. Political efficacy has 
a significant and positive effect on trust in institutions, both government 
and parliament, as well as the judiciary and public administration. This is 
not surprising because one is more likely to trust political institutions if 
one feels he or she can influence politics, and perceives participation as 
an efficient way to shape political outcomes. However, this effect does 
not hold for satisfaction with democracy, where political efficacy does not 
register significant effects. Satisfaction with economic performance has a 
significant positive effect on all three dependent variables, but the effect 
is strongest for democracy satisfaction, and weaker for trust in govern-
ment and trust in the judiciary and public administration. Again, this ef-
fect is expected and is confirmed by numerous studies of political regime 
support, whereby citizens satisfied with economic conditions, personal 
and national, are more supportive of democracy and have greater trust in 
political institutions (Magalhães, 2014; Armingeon & Gutthmann, 2014). 
Of the remaining variables, political knowledge and wealth do not show 
significant effects, while education does have a significant negative effect 
on satisfaction with democracy and trust in the judiciary and public ad-
ministration, but this effect does not significantly affect trust in govern-
ment. This is not unexpected, because better educated citizens are also 
likely to be more sophisticated and have a better understanding of the 
functioning of democracy and its institutions. The fact that we do not see 
this effect on trust in government is indicative, because trust in govern-
ment is likely to be more dependent on partisanship. Better educated citi-
zens, on the other hand, because of their greater sophistication, would be 
more likely to evaluate democracy and non-explicitly political institutions, 
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such as the judiciary and public administration, independently of partisan 
factors. This would also explain why the better educated are more critical 
than the less educated of democracy and democratic institutions. Age 
is significant only as a factor impacting trust in government, but it does 
not have an important impact on the two other dependent variables. It 
shows that older citizens have greater trust in government, while younger 
citizens are more critical, perhaps also because they feel less connected to 
parties and politics in general. 
Finally, we can see that there are significant effects of the election year 
on trust in government and satisfaction with democracy. A comparison 
of coefficients for dummy year variables shows that satisfaction with de-
mocracy and trust in government declines significantly between 2011 and 
2016, and this effect is particularly pronounced in the case of trust in 
government and somewhat less pronounced in the case of democracy sat-
isfaction. It may be observed that between the 2011 and 2016 elections 
satisfaction with democracy declined by half a point on a five-point scale, 
and trust in government declined by almost a whole point on a five-point 
scale. On the other hand, trust in the judiciary and public administration 
did not change significantly, though it did decline slightly. 
7. Conclusion
The findings support the expectations that partisanship is the principal 
factor shaping political support in Croatia. This is equally the case with 
satisfaction with democracy and with trust in political institutions. The 
effect of partisanship is certainly confounded by the effect of incumbency, 
which overlaps with partisanship. However, it is impossible to disentangle 
the effect of incumbency from that of partisanship because of overlap, 
and the fact that the effect of partisanship changes direction as changes 
in government composition take place. In any case, the findings of this 
analysis support the expectations stated before, and a more precise test 
can only be provided in a comparative setting where it would be possible 
to control for levels of polarisation across countries. 
Of the remaining variables, we see a consistent and important impact 
of satisfaction with economic performance, trust in others, and political 
authoritarianism. It is reasonable to argue that satisfaction with economic 
performance boosts satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions, 
because it is the task of political institutions and democratic systems to 
deliver favourable economic outcomes. However, in the Croatian context 
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in particular, economic preferences and evaluations of economic con-
ditions are themselves found to be shaped by partisanship. Support for 
the governing party is found to be associated with positive evaluations 
of economic conditions, and even preferences for policies, like taxation, 
are found to be affected by attitudes towards the party advocating these 
(Henjak, 2007). Therefore, it is possible that in the Croatian context the 
effect of partisanship is additionally translated through evaluations of 
economic conditions. Hence positive economic evaluations are relevant 
not only because satisfaction with the economy leads to satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in institutions, but also because they partially cap-
ture the effect of partisanship. The fact that the effects of education and 
wealth, the two variables measuring socioeconomic outcomes at an indi-
vidual level more directly, are either insignificant or negative, supports the 
proposition that the effect of economic evaluations is not only driven by 
economic evaluations but that it also partly channels the effect of parti-
sanship. This is the principal difference between Croatia and the findings 
of other studies analysing political support, where socioeconomic status, 
income, and employment are found to be significant and important sourc-
es of political support.
The remaining three significant independent variables: trust in others, po-
litical authoritarianism, and political efficacy are not related to partisan-
ship in any discernible way. Trust in others and political authoritarianism 
operate through what is, in effect, a transfer mechanism whereby political 
support is a function of a broader view of society. Political efficacy, in 
turn, captures the citizens’ view of politics. The impact of these variables 
can be summarised in three sentences. If one trusts his or her fellow citi-
zens, one is more likely to also have greater trust in political institutions. If 
one holds more authoritarian views, one is also likely to be more trusting 
of political institutions embodying political authority. If one believes he or 
she can influence politics, one is more likely to trust political institutions 
providing a channel for this influence. 
In conclusion, these findings have potentially significant implications for 
the way accountability and governance mechanisms work in Croatia. The 
dominant role of partisan identification in the evaluations of political in-
stitutions does not mean that accountability mechanisms do not work as 
they should, but it may lead to their reduced effectiveness. Also, if insti-
tutions which should not be part of political contestation, such as public 
administration and the judiciary, are evaluated through partisan lenses 
(as they seem to be), this might reduce their effectiveness and lead to the 
perception that they are biased. Further down the line, it might also make 
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them targets of demands that their perceived bias be addressed through 
political interference. This is especially because the perceived lack of their 
own political efficacy among the citizens is likely to lead to lower trust in 
institutions and might create favourable conditions for calls for political 
interference in their work. How likely it is that this course of events might 
take place will depend on the balance between evaluations based on par-
tisanship and evaluations based on outcomes. On balance, the evidence 
points to the preponderance of the former over the latter. 
References
Aarts, K,. & Thomassen, J. (2008). Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions 
matter? Electoral Studies, 27(1), 5 –18.
Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Listhaug, O. (2005). Losers’ 
consent: Elections and democratic legitimacy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press.
Andersen, R. (2012). Support for democracy in cross-national perspective: The 
detrimental effect of economic inequality. Research in Social Stratification and 
Mobility, 30(3), 389–402.
Anderson, C., & Tverdova, Y. (2001). Winners, losers and attitudes about gov-
ernment in contemporary democracies. International Political Science Review, 
22(4), 321–338.
Anderson, C., & LoTempio, A. (2002). Winning, losing and political trust in 
America. British Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 335–351.
Armingeon, K., & Guthmann, K. (2014). Democracy in crisis: The declining sup-
port for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011. European 
Journal of Political Research, 53(3), 423–442.
Bakker, R., de Vries, C., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G., … & Va-
chudova, M. (2015). Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill 
expert survey trend file 1999–2010. Party Politics, 21(1), 143–152.
Brennan G., & Lomasky, L. (1993). Democracy and decision: The pure theory of 
electoral preference. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Brennan G., & Hamlin, A. (2000). Democratic devices and desires. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press.
Cattenberg, G., & Moreno, A. (2005). The individual bases on political trust: 
Trends in new and established democracies. International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research, 18(1), 30–48.
Dahlberg, S., & Holmberg, S. (2012). Understanding satisfaction with the way de-
mocracy works [Working paper]. University of Gothenburg, Quality of Gov-





































Dahlberg, S., Linde, S., & Holmberg, S. (2013). Dissatisfied democrats [Working 
paper]. University of Gothenburg, Quality of Government Institute, retrieved 
from http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1448/1448856_2013_8_dahl-
berg_linde_holmberg.pdf  
Dalton, R. (1999). Political support in advanced industrial democracies. In P. 
Norris (Ed.), Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance. Oxford, 
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Dalton, R. (2005). The social transformation of trust in government. International 
Review of Sociology, 15(1), 133–154.
Devos, T., Spini, D., & Schwarts, S. (2002). Conflicts among human values and 
trust in institutions. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41(4), 481–494.
Dowely, K., & Silver, B. (2002). Social capital, ethnicity and support for democra-
cy in post-communist states. Europe-Asia Studies, 54(4), 525–527.
Easton, D. (1965). System analysis of political life. New York, NY: Wiley.
Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British 
Journal of Political Science, 5(4), 435–457.
Fisher, J., van Heerde, J., & Tucker, A. (2010). Does one trust judgement fit all: 
Linking theory and empirics. British Journal of Politics and International Rela-
tions, 12(2), 161–188.
Grdešić, M. (2013). Prostorna analiza »crvene« i »crne« Hrvatske: eksplorativ-
na studija [A spatial analysis of »red« and »black« Croatia: An exploratory 
study]. Politička misao, 50(1), 183–203.
Henjak, A. (2011). Stranačka identifikacija i granice stranačke mobilizacije u Hr-
vatskoj nakon 2000. godine [Partisan identification and the extent of party 
mobilisation in Croatia after 2000]. Političke perspektive, 1(1), 29–55.
Henjak, A. (2007). Values or interests: Economic determinants of voting behav-
iour in the 2007 Croatian parliamentary elections. Politička misao, 44(5), 
71–90.
Henjak, A., Zakošek, N., & Čular, G. (2013). Croatia. In S. Bergund, J. Erman, 
K. Deegan Krause, & T. Knutsen (Eds.), Handbook of political change in East-
ern Europe. Chentelham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Hooghe, M. (2011). Why there is basically only one form of political trust. British 
Journal of Political Science, 13(2), 269–275.
Jou, W. (2010). Continuities and changes in left–right orientations in new de-
mocracies: The cases of Croatia and Slovenia. Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, 43(1), 97–113.
Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. (2007). Citizen–politician linkages: An introduc-
tion. In H. Kitschelt & S. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients, and policies: Pat-
terns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
362


















Klingemann, H.-D. (1999). Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global anal-
ysis, and political support in advanced industrial democracies. In P. Norris 
(Ed.), Critical citizen: Global support for democratic governance (pp 31–56). Ox-
ford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Körösényi, A. (2013). Political polarization and its consequences on democratic 
accountability. Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 4(2), 3–30.
Krieckhaus, J., Son, B., Mukherjee Bellinger, N., & Wells, J. (2013). Economic 
Inequality and Democratic Support. The Journal of Politics, 76(1), 139–151. 
Linde, J. (2012). Why feed the hand that bites you: Perceptions of procedural fair-
ness and system support in post-communist democracies. European Journal of 
Political Research, 51(3), 410–434.
Magalhães, P. (2014). Government effectiveness and support for democracy. Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Research, 53(1), 77–97.
Norris, P. (1999). Introduction: The growth of critical citizens? In P. Norris (Ed.), 
Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance. Oxford, United King-
dom: Oxford University Press.
Singh, S., Karakoc, E., & Blais, A. (2012). Differentiating winners: How elections 
affect satisfaction with democracy. Electoral Studies, 31(2), 201–211.
Šiber, I. (2001). Političko ponašanje u izborima 1990–2000 [Political behaviour 
in elections 1990–2000]. In M. Kasapović (Ed.), Hrvatska politika 1990-2000. 
Zagreb, Croatia: Fakultet političkih znanosti.
Tóka, G. (2003, August). The impact of cross-cutting cleavages on citizens’ political 
involvement. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.
Zakošek, N. (1998). Ideološki rascjepi i stranačke preferencije hrvatskih bi-
rača [Ideological divisions and party preferences of Croatian voters]. In M. 
Kasapović, I. Šiber & N. Zakošek (Eds.), Birači i demokracija: utjecaj ideoloških 
rascjepa na politički život. Zagreb, Croatia: Alinea.
Zakošek N., & Čular, G. (2004). Croatia. In S. Bergund, J. Erman, & Arebrot F. 
(Eds.), Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Chentelham, United 
Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing.
363






























INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND DEMOCRACY SATISFACTION 
IN CROATIA: PARTISANSHIP- VERSUS OUTCOME-DRIVEN 
EVALUATIONS
Summary
The article investigates the determinants of trust in institutions and satisfaction 
with democracy in Croatia. The article starts with the proposition that effective 
governance requires efficient accountability mechanisms, whereby political ac-
tors and institutions, as well as democracy performance, are evaluated on the 
basis of the outcomes they deliver to citizens. However, in highly polarised socie-
ties, evaluations of political institutions and regime performance are more likely 
to depend on how well these express the preferences and identities of citizens 
rather than on the governance outcomes they deliver. Thus, in strongly polar-
ised societies, where politics is seen as a zero-sum game, evaluations of political 
institutions and democracy performance are likely to be dependent on partisan 
identification and political identity representation. Evaluations of the democrat-
ic regime and trust in institutions in Croatia as a highly polarised society are 
more likely to be shaped by partisan identification and representation than by 
the outcomes delivered. The article proceeds to test these propositions with survey 
data collected for the 2011, 2015, and 2016 elections. The article tests these 
propositions using multiple regression analysis testing the impact of partisan-
ship in comparison with a range of other factors measuring political attitudes, 
political efficacy, economic evaluations, social trust, political knowledge, and 
socioeconomic position. The analysis finds that the impact of partisanship, and 
variables found to be related to partisanship, is strong and significant, both for 
political institutions, such as trust in parliament and government, and non-po-
litical institutions, such as trust in judiciary and public administration. Similar 
findings are also established for evaluations of democracy. The analysis also 
establishes that the impact of partisanship is more consistently significant than 
the impact of other variables, and that it is strongest for evaluations of democra-
cy, followed by trust in government and parliament, and finally trust in public 
administration and the judiciary.
Keywords: trust in institutions, democracy satisfaction, political support, po-
larisation
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VJERA U INSTITUCIJE I ZADOVOLJSTVO DEMOKRACIJOM U 
HRVATSKOJ: OCJENE NA TEMELJU POLITIČKE PRISTRANOSTI 
NASUPROT OCJENAMA NA TEMELJU REZULTATA
Sažetak
U radu se istražuju determinante koje određuju vjeru u institucije i zadovoljstvo 
demokracijom u Hrvatskoj. Polazi se od pretpostavke da učinkovito upravljanje 
podrazumijeva učinkovite mehanizme odgvornosti putem kojih se političke ak-
tere i institucije, kao i demokraciju u praksi, ocjenjuje na temelju rezultata koje 
isporučuju građanima. Ipak, u duboko je podijeljenim društvima veća vjerojat-
nost da će građani političke institucije i djelovanje političkog poretka ocijeniti 
ovisno o tome koliko oni uspješno odražavaju preferencije i identitet građana, 
a ne na temelju rezultata njihova upravljanja. U takvim duboko podijeljenim 
društvima koja politiku doživljavaju kao igru u kojoj jedna strana mora dobiti 
a druga izgubiti, vjerojatno je da će ocjene političkih institucija i demokratskog 
djelovanja ovisiti o poistovjećivanju građana s pojedinim političkim strankama 
i u kojoj mjeri one predstavljaju njihov politički identitet. Na ocjene demokrat-
skog poretka te vjere u institucije u duboko podijeljenome hrvatskom društvu 
vjerojatnije će utjecati poistovjećivanje s političkim strankama nego rezultati 
upravljanja. U radu se provjerava utemeljenost navedenih pretpostavki na os-
novi podataka o izborima 2011., 2015. i 2016. godine. Primjenom višestruke 
regresijske analize nastoji se utvrditi utjecaj političke pristranosti u usporedbi s 
brojnim drugim čimbenicima kojima se mjere politički stavovi, politička učinko-
vitost, ocjena ekonomske situacije, povjerenje u društvo, znanje o politici i društ-
veno-ekonomski položaj. Rezultati analize upućuju na to da je utjecaj političke 
pristranosti, kao i varijabli koje su s njime povezane, snažan i statistički znača-
jan i kada je riječ o povjerenju u političke institucije poput Sabora i Vlade i 
kada je riječ o povjerenju u institucije koje nisu političke, primjerice pravosudni 
sustav i javnu upravu. Rezultati su slični pri ocjenjivanju demokracije te se ut-
vrđuje da utjecaj političke pristranosti ima dosljednije statističko značenje od 
utjecaja drugih varijabli. Također se utvrđuje da je utjecaj političke pristranosti 
najjači kod ocjenjivanja demokracije, potom kod povjerenja u Vladu i Sabor te 
konačno kod povjerenja u javnu upravu i pravosuđe. 
Ključne riječi: vjera u institucije, zadovoljstvo demokracijom, politička podrš-
ka, polarizacija
